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SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION
A COMMENT ON BELL & DAWSON
BRUCE E. STERN*
Ian Bell and Petrina Dawson’s article, Synthetic Securitization:
Use of Derivative Technology for Credit Transfers, describes the bene-
fits of funded, as compared to unfunded, synthetic securitizations,
concluding that “unfunded synthetic securitizations fall short of the
traditional securitization product in a number of key ways.”1  Notably,
unfunded securitizations fail to eliminate credit exposure to the pro-
tection seller.  From the vantage point of a financial guaranty insurer,
however, unfunded transactions have two important benefits as com-
pared to unfunded transactions.  First, funded transactions are more
expensive to implement due to the complexity of the documentation,
the need to establish and maintain special purpose vehicles, and the
underwriting costs associated with placement of credit linked notes.
Second, the size of funded transactions is constrained by the capital
markets’ inability to absorb large (multi-billion dollar) note issuances
in this sector.
Instead of relying exclusively upon the capital markets, a mate-
rial portion of the market for unfunded transactions in this sector has
relied upon highly-rated counterparties—often triple-A rated finan-
cial guaranty insurers—to provide appropriate credit enhancement on
the less risky tranches of certain transactions.  The more costly
funded protection is employed on the more risky tranches of the
transactions that would not otherwise comply with the underwriting
requirements of the financial guaranty insurers or other highly-rated
protection sellers.  In 2001, the financial guaranty insurance sector in-
sured dozens of multi-billion dollar credit default swaps, typically
providing coverage to protection buyers for losses in excess of a sub-
stantial “deductible,” with risk on the deductible portion retained by
the protection buyer, covered under other credit default swaps,
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and/or covered on a funded basis by credit linked notes.  The de-
ductible portion represents a so-called “compressed” risk, which
bears the risk of the first dollar of loss, but represents generally ten to
twenty percent of the total transaction on a par basis.
A discussion of synthetic transactions is not complete without
touching on some of the hazards involved with this methodology.
Such hazards include the tendency to hedge exposures with different
counterparties while underwriting one’s own risk on the basis of the
net exposure (assuming performance by both the initial derivative
and the hedged derivative), and the existence of credit cliffs inherent
in downgrade triggers or material adverse change clauses that may in-
voke termination rights on the part of performing derivative counter-
parties, but not on the part of the party that suffered the downgrade
or material adverse change.  The interrelationship of these two haz-
ards appears to have contributed to the demise of Enron, where
downgrade triggers apparently allowed counterparties to terminate
derivatives that were out of the money to Enron, but did not permit
Enron to terminate derivatives that were in the money with respect to
itself.
Due to the ease of execution of synthetic transactions and the
lack of friction costs (i.e., legal fees, underwriting fees, trustee fees,
and so forth) associated with funded transactions, it is commercially
simpler to assemble an extremely large book of exposures with an
apparently small net exposure if opposite-way transactions are al-
lowed to offset each other.  The sheer magnitude of these books be-
comes dangerous if the originator of the book suffers financial dis-
tress that allows counterparties to terminate positions that are
disadvantageous to the originator, but does not allow the originator
to terminate positions advantageous to the originator.  In such an
event, the originator’s book becomes unhedged and the originator is
unable to replace the terminated positions because other counterpar-
ties are not prepared to rely upon the originator’s credit.
Further hazards arise in the world of unfunded synthetics trans-
actions because it has evolved without the benefit of securities law
disclosure requirements typical even for privately-placed security
transactions.  Less sophisticated market participants can be unaware
of the implications of various provisions or ambiguities in the ISDA
forms.2  While funded transactions typically involve issuers, trustees,
2. See generally ISDA Master Agreement 1992, available at http://www.isda.org
/publications/1992masterlc.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); and 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions, available at http://www.isda.org/c1html#CD (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
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rating agencies, and underwriters (each represented by counsel), un-
funded transactions are often executed over the telephone prior to fi-
nalization of “exceptions” to the ISDA forms.  As the market
evolves, so do the disputes and lawsuits regarding the scope of cover-
age and the disclosure responsibilities associated with these transac-
tions.  While ISDA forms for credit default swaps continue to evolve,
sophisticated counterparties negotiate numerous terms in the sched-
ules to the ISDA forms in an attempt to better define the scope of
coverage and reduce the potential for abuse.
Still other hazards arise from different performance incentives
inherent in synthetic, as opposed to funded, securitizations.  In a cus-
tomary funded securitization transaction, the issuer (more precisely,
the residual holder/servicer/manager) of the securities is motivated
not to default on its payment obligations.  The issuer generally suffers
adverse consequences (often bankruptcy) if it does default on a pay-
ment obligation.  In an unfunded (synthetic) transaction, however,
the protection buyer (unlike a customary note issuer) may actually
profit from a default in the underlying transaction if it does not have a
corresponding opposite-way exposure.
Because of these different incentives, the purchaser of a tradi-
tional collateralized bond obligation (CBO) security may bear an ap-
preciably different risk than the credit protection seller or credit
linked note purchaser, notwithstanding that the credit exposure of the
two risks might bear the same rating from the securities rating agen-
cies.  In some cases, credit default swaps are analogous to allowing
corporations to buy life insurance policies on other people’s lives as
an investment or speculation.  This results in a situation where the in-
terests of the policy beneficiary and the insured person are at odds.
Finally, synthetic securitizations are better able to mask arbitrage
opportunities because of the relative opaqueness of the credit deriva-
tive market as compared to the capital markets.  For example, if a
funded collateralized debt obligation (CDO) issuer raises $500 mil-
lion of proceeds, the issuer will be motivated to invest in securities at
the most attractive price available to it, and discounts will be trans-
parent and result in increased credit support (e.g., if the investment
portfolio is purchased for 80 cents on the dollar, then the transaction
will be backed by $600 million of bonds).  In a synthetic CDO, how-
ever, it is difficult to ascertain the protection fees allocable to the ref-
erenced securities, either individually or in the aggregate, and the
protection buyer may be motivated to include reference securities
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with higher credit spreads not reflected by other indicia such as rat-
ings or share prices.
